Since 2017, Uzbekistan’s Prosecutor’s Office has swung between two opposite reforms: from 2017 to 2020 it lost Soviet-era “general supervision” powers deemed incompatible with separation of powers (with business and tax oversight moving to other agencies and staff cut by about 1,200), while since 2023 that trend has reversed, as the revised Constitution embedded the office more firmly in state structure, a 2024 law expanded its court role, and 2025-2026 reforms handed it corruption and other criminal investigations. This article argues that the second wave, though framed as efficiency reform, revives the concentration-of-power risk the first wave sought to reduce, a risk the UN Special Rapporteur flagged in 2019 over the Prosecutor General’s appointment procedure, and, drawing on UN and Council of Europe standards and the Venice Commission’s opinion on Russia’s Prokuratura Law, it proposes safeguards (judicial review of prosecutorial acts outside criminal proceedings and published oversight statistics) to preserve the gains of the expanded mandate without reopening the accountability gap the earlier reforms closed.