Subsidy regulation is a critical component of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) legal system, aimed at preventing market distortions and promoting fair competition. Unregulated subsidies can lead to overproduction, price distortions, and the dumping of goods, undermining the competitiveness of other WTO members. This paper employs a doctrinal legal research method to examine the WTO’s regulatory framework on subsidies, focusing on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement), and the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). The findings show that while the SCM Agreement provides a clear classification system for subsidies—prohibited, actionable, and non-actionable—loopholes and ambiguities persist. The relationship between the SCM Agreement and the AoA is complementary but reveals sector-specific disparities, particularly in agricultural subsidies. Challenges include regulatory gaps in addressing new forms of subsidies, perceived imbalances between developed and developing countries, and enforcement limitations. The paper recommends comprehensive reforms to close legal loopholes, adapt to modern subsidy practices, and ensure equitable treatment of all WTO members.